Few people realize that South Africa is the only African country to have developed nuclear weapons. During the apartheid era, South Africa secretly built a small arsenal of nuclear bombs in the 1970s and 1980s, making it a unique case on the continent and in the world. This covert program was motivated by the government’s desire to assert political leverage amid international isolation and regional conflicts.

South Africa’s nuclear weapons program began in the late 1940s but accelerated in the 1970s as the government sought a “political weapon” to deter perceived threats. By the 1980s, South Africa had constructed six gun-type fission bombs, with a seventh under construction.

These weapons were never tested but were stored securely at facilities such as Pelindaba. The program was shrouded in secrecy, with only a handful of officials aware of its true scope.

The government’s rationale was not to use the bombs militarily but to gain diplomatic leverage, especially against Soviet-backed forces in southern Africa. Prime Minister P.W. Botha described the nuclear deterrent as a tool for persuasion and negotiation rather than warfare. The program’s secrecy was breached in 1977 when preparations for a nuclear test in the Kalahari Desert were detected by US and Soviet intelligence, leading to international pressure that prevented the test.

In a historic move, South Africa voluntarily dismantled its nuclear arsenal by 1989 under President F.W. de Klerk, becoming the only country to develop and then completely give up nuclear weapons. This decision was influenced by the impending end of apartheid and the transition to majority rule.

South Africa joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1991 and allowed international inspections, signaling a commitment to nuclear disarmament.

South Africa’s nuclear story is a remarkable example of a country that developed nuclear weapons for political reasons but chose disarmament as part of a peaceful transition. It remains a unique case in Africa and the world, illustrating both the complexities of nuclear proliferation and the possibilities for voluntary denuclearization.